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In 1965, in an introduction written for a series of essays entitled "The 
Necgro American" in the scholarly journal Daedalus, President Lyndon 
Johnson wrote: "Nothing is of greater significance to the welfare and 
vitality of this nation than the movement to secure equal rights for 
Negro Americans" (Daedalus, 1981: v). Johnson spoke these words 
at the zenith of personal and national attention to the state of black 
America. Three years later the commission that he had appointed to 
investigate the causes of the civil disorders that swept American cities 
during the late 1960s - disorders that claimed a toll of over 100 lives 
and millions of dollars in property damage - attributed the primary 
responsibility for the outbreaks to "white racism" and concluded that 
"there can be no higher claim on the Nation's conscience" than to 
eliminate "deepening racial division" by a "compassionate, . . . massive, 
and sustained" commitment of resources and energy" (National 
Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders, 1968). 
Yet Johnson, by that time preoccupied with the escalation of the war 
in Vietnam, ignored the commission's recommendations, just as his 
successor, Richard Nixon, disputed its basic conclusions. Thus, during 
the 1970s, despite several significant private and governmental efforts 
to implement programs to achieve racial equality, the state of black 
America no longer occupied the prominence in the American con- 
sciousness that it did in 1965. The policy of "benign neglect" that 
Daniel P. Moynihan urged Richard Nixon to adopt towards blacks 
appears to have been realized. As the editors of a 1981 issue of Daedalus 
- - 
devoted to American racial minorities wrote, "It is a measure of the 
distance we have traveled in sixteen years that it is almost unthinkable 
to imagine any white politician today making such a statement as 
Johnson's in 1965, giving such primacy to the issue of racial equality" 
(Daedalus, 1981: vi). 
* I would like to thank Karen Kirk Sorensen for her assistance in obtaining several 
sources used in this paper. 
If there has been a decline in attention devoted to the state of black 
America since the late 60s, there has also been a corresponding surge 
of interest in ethnicity and a reassertion of the importance of ethnic 
pluralism. The heightened cultural and political self-awareness that 
characterized the black protest movement of the 1960s extended in the 
1970s to Hispanics, Native Americans, Asians, and, especially, to 
"white ethnics" - those descendants, primarily Catholic, of southern 
and eastern Europeans who had migrated to the United States in 
massive numbers between 1890 and 1915. As the nation's preoccupa- 
tion with black America waned, interest in ethnicity became increasingly 
fashionable. 
In this essay I would like to examine the dominant developments and 
trends of the past decade that relate to race and ethnicity. I will first 
consider the nature and implications of the changing demography of 
American racial and ethnic groups. I will then turn my attention to the 
"ethnic revival" of the 1970s and its relation to the changmg status of 
European ethnic groups and, finally, to an assessment of continuities 
and changes in the status of black Americans. 
Demographic Changes in the 1970s 
In order adequately to comprehend the dynamics of ethnic relations 
during the 1970s and to anticipate the nature of ethnic relations in the 
future, it may be useful to examine briefly some of the demographic 
changes that occurred during the 1970s. Table 1 provides the basic 
data for several broad racial and ethnic categories that were obtained 
in the 1980 federal census. Primarily because of increased Asian and 
Latin immigration and relatively lower birth rates among whites, the 
white percentage of the population is less today than at any time since 
the Civil War; blacks, Asians, American Indians, and Hispanics now 
comprise more than one-fifth (20.3 percent) of the American people. 
The nation's largest racial minority - blacks - increased by ap- 
proximately four million to a total of 26 and a half million, or more 
than the entire population of Canada or of the Scandinavian countries 
of Sweden, Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Iceland combined. As 
in 1970, blacks continued to be found overwhelmingly in the nation's 
urban areas - especially in the nation's largest cities. Today New York 
City has a black population of more than one and three-quarters 
million, more than any other city in the world and than any state in the 
country. Chicago has more blacks than Mississippi or South Carolina, 
Philadelphia more than Arkansas and Kentucky combined (Pettigrew, 
19'79). For the first time in this century, there was little change in the 
percentage of blacks - slightly more than half (53%) of the total black 
population - who lived in the South. Although some blacks were 
still migrating from the South to the North and West, their numbers 
were nearly balanced by blacks who were moving to this region. 
During the 1970s Hispanics (a general rubric that includes several 
extremely disparate national and ethnic categories - Cubans, Puerto 
Ricans, Mexicans, Colombians, Argentines, etc.) increased by more 
than five million, or more than 61 percent, an increase that was greater 
both proportionately and numerically than the black population, which 
grew by 17 percent. Although earlier predictions that by 1990 Hispanics 
will exceed the number of blacks in the country seem exaggerated, the 
increase in the Hispanic population was substantial. California had the 
greatest number of Hispanics - more than four and a half million, 
or about 31 percent of the 14.6 million enumerated in 1980. Texas 
and New York state together accounted for a comparable number, 
thus enabling these three states alone to account for more than three- 
fifths of all Hispanics in the country. Reflecting its historic role as the 
nation's - indeed, the world's - most ethnically diverse city, New 
York City remained the American city with the largest Hispanic 
population. Today blacks and Hispanics together comprise more than 
42 percent of New York's population. 
Among the most striking demographic changes of the last decade, 
however, was the growth of the Asian population, which nearly doubled 
between 1970 and 1980. During the 1970s the number of Koreans 
increased by 412%, the number of Filipinos by 125%, and the number 
of Chinese by 85%. The number of Chinese and Filipinos both surpas- 
sed the Japanese, who in 1970 had the largest Asian ethnic group. 
Moreover, more than one-third million Asian Indians and more than 
one-quarter million Vietnamese, neither of whom had previously been 
separately enumerated, helped to swell the number of Asians to more 
than three and a half million. Regionally, Asians were concentrated in 
the West, especially in California, which had more Chinese, Japanese, 
Filipinos, Koreans, and Vietnamese than any other state. 
The rapidly growing numbers of Hispanics and Asians reflected 
changes in American Immigration law embodied in the Immigration 
Reform Act of 1965, which went into effect in 1968. This law dramat- 
ically changed the underlying rationale of America's immigration 
policy. The previous law, which was enacted in 1924, had established 
immigration quotas for each country based on the assumption that 
some people (e.g., the British, who were allocated more than 65,000 
of the 150,000 annual quotas) were more assimilable and hence more 
desirable than others (such as the Italians, who were granted a quota 
of less than 6,000, or the Greeks, whose quota was 310). Reflecting 
the racist assumptions upon which it was based, most Asians had been 
excluded completely. 
Enacted at the height of the "equality revolution" of the 1960s, the 
1965 law eliminated the old quota system, increased the annual number 
of quotas to 170,000, placed a maximum limit of 20,000 per country, 
and for the first time established a limit (of 120,000) on immigration 
from the western hemisphere. It also established a series of preferences 
for those who would be reunited with their families, for those with 
occupational skills needed in the United States, and for political 
refugees. 
Throughout the 1970s the number of permanent immigrants in- 
creased substantially, so that by 1980 more than 880,000 immigrants 
were legally admitted, a number greater than in any year since 1914. 
Given the declining birth rate of the American population, immigrants 
now account for a much more substantial percentage of the nation's 
total population growth than they have since the first two decades of the 
twentieth century. 
Even more dramatic than the increase in numbers, however, were 
the changes in the sources from which immigrants were being drawn. 
Before enactment of the 1965 law, immigrants into the United States 
had historically been overwhelmingly Europeans. Today the predom- 
inant sources of immigration are Asia, Central and South America, 
and the Caribbean. European immigration declined from nearly 
three-fifths of the total (59 percent) during the 1950s to one-eighth 
(12 percent) in 1978. Similarly, Asian immigration increased from 6 
percent to 42 percent and immigrants from the western hemisphere 
(not including Canadians) rose from 23 percent to 41 percent. In 1978 
the leading countries from which the United States received immigrants 
were Mexico, the West Indies, Vietnam, the Philippines, Cuba, Korea, 
Dominican Republic, China, and India. Reflecting these changes, 
Polenberg has recently pointed out that by 1976 the United States 
"was receiving fewer immigrants from Italy and Greece combined than 
from India alone, fewer from Germany than from Thailand, fewer 
from Ireland than from Egypt, and fewer from Poland than from 
Trinidad and Tobago" (Polenberg, 1980: 282). 
The preference for those with skills needed by the United States has 
meant that immigrants entering today are much more highly educated 
than in the past. Physicians, nurses, scientists, architects, artists, enter- 
tainers, engineers, and others with highly technical skills have con- 
tributed to a "brain drain," first from Europe and later from Third 
World nations that can least afford to lose their skills. (For example, 
more than half the physicians in New York City's municipal hospitals 
today are graduates of foreign medical schools). The preference for 
skills has meant that, unlike the situation during the peak years of 
American immigration between 1840 and 1920, it has become almost 
impossible for unskilled laborers to gain entrance unless they can claim 
a close family relationship or refugee status. It has also meant that, 
increasingly, the less highly skilled have resorted to illegal means to 
enter the country. 
The category of refugees has proved to be a perennial problem. 
Given the existence of over 13 million political and economic refugees 
in the world today, the moral and political pressures to admit refugees 
are considerable. However, the refugee quotas established under the 
1965 law and its subsequent revisions have proved inadequate to 
respond to these pressures. In some instances, as in the case of the 
Vietnamese, special laws were passed to enable the President to respond 
to emergency situations. In others, such as the case of the Cuban 
"freedom flotilla" in 1980, the political power of the American Cuban 
community and the propaganda value of thousands fleeing Castro's 
regime permitted a de facto circumvention of the law. However, as 
indicated by the cases of the Haitians or the Salvadorans, whose plight 
has been less widely publicized, the definition of "refugee" is essentially 
a political judgment. Although refugees from many oppressive political 
regimes have sought asylum in the United States, official government 
policy has given special treatment primarily to those fleeing Com- 
munism (e.g., the Cubans and the Vietnamese). There has been no 
- 
comparable groundswell of support for those fleeing the rightist junta 
in El Salvador nor for admitting the basically unskilled Haitians seeking 
to escape poverty and the reactionary regime of "Baby Doc" Duvalier. 
Finally, some brief comments about the extraordinarily complex 
issue of illegal immigrants are in order. The number of "undocumented 
aliens," who are primarily from Mexico and the Caribbean, ranges 
from 3 to 12 million. One of the most frequently cited sources of illegal 
immigration is the population explosion in Third World nations. 
However, population growth alone cannot account for the growing 
pressures for immigration. Paradoxically, Third World economic 
development, not underdevelopment, has contributed significantly. 
Economic development, with an emphasis on consumerism and con- 
sumption greatly influenced by an American model and American 
economic forces, has transformed the social structures of many devel- 
oping societies. Simultaneously, unemployment, underemployment, 
and income inequalities preclude access by the majority of the popula- 
tion of these countries to these consumer goods. As Alejandro Portes, 
one of the leading American experts on recent Latin immigration into 
the United States, has written in regard to Mexico, "In the eyes of the 
Mexican worker, the United States stands as the place where the 
benefits of an advanced economy, promised but not delivered by the 
present [~exican]  national development strategy, can be turned into 
reality" (Portes, l982:517-18). Ironically, the very economic forces 
generated by the American economic system, which has penetrated ex- 
tensively into the economic life of Third World societies, have been in- 
strumental in attracting the massive influx of immigrants to the United 
States. Thus, given the thrust of the modernization process and the im- 
pact of American political and economic power throughout the world, 
it appears inevitable that the United States will continue to attract irn- 
migrants - legal and illegal - from Third World sources, thereby re- 
inforcing and recreating the historic ethnic diversity that, almost from 
its very founding, has characterized American society. 
The Ethnic Remval 
The reality of this "new immigrant wave" became a phenomenon of 
growing significance at precisely the time that, as mentioned previously, 
ethnicity and the celebration of America's ethnic diversity became more 
fashionable than ever before in its existence. 
The notion of an ethnic revival, a resurgence of ethnicity, was 
especially reflected by increased academic attention to ethnicity during 
the 1970s, which was symbolized by the founding of several journals 
devoted to its analysis: Ethnzczty (1974), Journal of Ethnzc Studzes 
(1 974), Ethnic and Racial Studies (1978), MELUS (Multiethnic 
Literature in the United States) (1975), and, most recently, the Journal 
of Amerzcan Ethnic Nutory (1981). Finally, one of the most salient 
indices of the decade's rediscovery of ethnicity was publication in 1980 
of the Haward Encyclopedia of American Ethnic Groups, the most 
comprehensive resource available on the subject today. 
The central issue in the debate over ethnicity concerned the nature 
of the assimilation process and the extent to which various ethnic 
groups have been - and should permit themselves to be - integrated, 
incorporated, or assimilated into the mainstream of American society. 
In his now classic analysis, Assimilation in American Life (1964), Milton 
Gordon distinguished among three ideologies or conceptual models - 
Anglo-Conformity , the melting pot, the cultural pluralism - that 
have been used to explain the dynamics of intergroup relations in 
American life. 
Anglo-conformity assumes that an ethnic minority should give up 
its distinctive cultural characteristics and adopt those of the dominant 
group. It can be expressed by the formula A + B + C = A, in which A 
is the dominant group and B and C represent ethnic minority groups 
that must conform to the values and life styles of the dominant group 
if they wish to achieve positions of power and prestige in the society. 
A policy of Anglo-conformity seeks a homogeneous society organized 
around the idealized cultural standards, institutions, and language 
of the dominant group. 
Like Anglo-conformity, the ultimate objective of a "rneltzng pot" po- 
licy is a society without ethnic differences. More tolerant than a policy 
of Anglo-conformity, the melting pot ideal sees ethnic differences as 
being lost in the creation of a new society and a new people - a 
synthesis unique and distinct from any of the different groups that 
formed it. Unlike Anglo-conformity, none of the contributing groups 
is considered to be superior; each is considered to have contributed 
the best of its cultural heritage to the creation of a new amalgam (e.g., 
Crevecoeur's new man). The melting pot ideal can be expressed by 
the formula A +  B + C = D, in which A B and C represent the 
different contributing groups and D is the product of their synthesis. 
Cultural pluralcm refers to a system in which different cultures can 
coexist and be preserved. According to this notion, the strength and 
vitality of American society are derived from the many different ethnic 
groups that have made it a "nation of nations." Each group should be 
permitted to retain its unique qualities while affirming its allegiance 
to the larger society. It can be expressed by the equation A + B + C = 
A + B + C, in which A, B, and C are each ethnic groups that maintain 
their distinctiveness over time (Newrnan, 1973). 
The main theme of the ethnic revival was the rediscovery and reasser- 
tion of the importance and value of cultural pluralism and a rejection 
of Anglo-conformity and melting pot conceptions, both of which 
envision an ideal society that ultimately is culturally homogeneous 
rather than culturally diverse. Although blacks, Chicanos, Puerto 
Ricans, Native Americans, and Asians each asserted their <nique 
cultural distinctiveness and rejected what they perceived as efforts 
to impose the culture of white middle class America on them, the 
primary impetus for the ethnic revival of the 1970s was from the so- 
called "white ethnics." 
Spokespersons for the ethnic revival maintained that the movement 
represented a -spontaneous and broadly based reassertion of ethnic 
pride that was not restricted to intellectuals but reflected primarily 
the frequently ignored, unarticulated, but pervasive sentiments of 
working class ethnics as well. Michael Novak, the grandson of Slovakian 
immigrants and author of The Rzhe of the Unmeltable Ethnics (1971), 
was one of the foremost proponents of the "new ethnicity." He identified 
two basic elements in the new ethnicity: a sensitivity to and appreciation 
of the importance of ethnic pluralism and a self-conscious examination 
of one's own cultural heritage (Novak, 1971:17). Another prominent 
spokesman, Andrew Greeley, the prolific Irish-American sociologist, 
priest, and novelist, noted several ways in which this ethnic "consciousness 
raising" occurred: increased interest in the literary, intellectual, and 
- 
artistic culture of one's ethnic background; visits to one's ancestral home- 
land; and increased use of one's ancestral language (Greeley, 1975: 
149-51). 
What are the reasons for this resurgence of ethnicity during the 70s? 
Foremost was the impact that the black protest movement had on the 
self-definition of other ethnic groups, in particular "white ethnics." On 
the one hand, the emphasis on black pride and on understanding 
black culture stimulated by the civil rights movement of the late 50s 
and 60s led many white ethnics to consider their own heritages more 
closely. 
On the other hand, spokespersons for "white ethnics" criticized what 
they perceived to be the myopia of the white liberal, basically Prote- 
stant, Establishment. They contended that liberal academics and 
journalists, especially, were oblivious to the discrimination to which 
white ethnics historically had been subjected and tended to portray 
them as the primary source of racism toward blacks. For many white 
ethnics who felt that they had been the object of derision by liberals, 
such charges merely reinforced their perception that the conditions 
of their lives had not been given the same sympathetic treatment that 
was being given to blacks, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans, and Native 
Americans. Novak contends that from the white liberal perspective, 
these latter are "legitimate" minorities, but that the designation of 
"white ethnics" as minorities was unacceptable. The white ethnic's 
perspective, Novak wrote, was that "he is being asked to pay the entire 
price of the injustices done to blacks - he who is living on the margin 
himself - while those who are enriched pay nothing" (Novak, 1975: 
112). Thus the ethnic revival was in some respects a defensive response 
to external pressures, particularly in its opposition to an increasingly 
strident black protest movement, rather than a positive, liberating 
affirmation of self-identity. 
In another sense, however, the movement had little to do with 
factors external to the "white ethnic" groups but was derived from 
the very success of these groups' adaptation to American society. By 
the 1970s the fourth generation of the southern and eastern European 
immigrants were entering adulthood. As the distance from their 
ancestral roots increased, their identification with these roots weakened. 
The decline of the ancestral language, the dispersion of ethnic neigh- 
borhoods, declining participation in and identification with the 
traditional religious community, and increased rates of ethnic inter- 
marriage contributed to the decline of a meaningful ethnic identity. 
Another of the major factors was what Greeley has termed the 
"ethnic miracle" (1982). Using extensive national social surveys, Greeley 
contends that "the ethnics have made it." The income levels of Irish, 
German, Italian, and Polish Catholics are today exceeded only by 
Jews, not by White Anglo-Saxon Protestants. Although the overall 
educational 'levels of Polish, Italian, and Slavic Catholics lag behind 
the national white average, when parental educational levels are held 
constant, Catholic ethnics have higher educational achievements than 
any other ethnic group except Jews. Indeed, Irish Catholics, once the 
most despised and unfavorably stereotyped of all European ethnic 
groups, are today "the richest, best educated, and most prestigious 
occupationally of any gentile religio-ethnic group." Thus, Greeley 
concludes, "in a very short space of time, the length of one generation, 
more or less, the American dream has come true" for European 
Catholic ethnic groups. The increased economic, educational, and 
occupational mobility that Greeley has documented indicates that 
"white ethnics" have moved into the mainstream of American society, 
where their identification with their ethnic origins has become in- 
creasingly remote (Greeley, 1982). 
Moreover, there is considerable evidence that ethnicity as a source 
of social cohesion is decreasing, especially among the third and fourth 
generations. In ''Symbolic Ethnicity" (1982), Herbert Gans disputes the 
notion of an enduring ethnic revival, arguing that cultural and social 
assimilation continue to take place in American society. Ethnicity 
is no longer rooted in group membership or cultural patterns but 
instead has become "symbolic," a matter of choice, an ethnicity of 
"last resort." In his study of an Italian-American community in Boston 
in the 196% Gans did not find ethnicity to be increasing. Instead, he 
found a "straight line" decline in ethnicity over three generations. That 
is, ethnicity was less significant in each succeeding generation (Gans, 
1962). More recently, a study by Sandberg showed a constant decline 
in ethnic consciousness, identification, and cohesion among Polish- 
Americans in Los Angeles; by the fourth generation, ethnicity had 
ceased to play an important role in their lives (Sandberg, 1974). 
Recent analyses suggest that white ethnics have also experienced 
considerable social and marital assimilation, especially as individual 
members of specific ethnic groups have achieved middle-class status. 
In national studies of social assimilation among American Catholics, 
Alba (1981, 1982) has found that marriage outside one's ethnic group 
has been extensive. He also found that rates of inter-marriage were 
most pronounced among the third generation and among the youngest 
members of each ethnic groups. Similarly, in his study of ethnic con- 
sciousness in Providence, Rhode Island, among Irish and Italians, 
Goering found that only 15 percent of the first generation had married 
outside their own ethnic group, whereas 63 percent of the third genera- 
tion had done so (Goering, 1971:382n). 
Further evidence of the trend toward greater social and marital 
assimilation can be found in the rates of intermarriage for American 
Jews and for Japanese-Americans. The rate of Jewish intermarriage 
increased from approximately 3 percent of Jews marrying non-Jews 
between 1900 and 1940 to nearly one-third (32 percent) between 1966 
and 1972 (Massarick, n.d.:lO). Even more dramatic is the increasing 
rate of marital assimilation among Japanese-Americans. Tinker (1973) 
found that more than half the marriages of Japanese were to non- 
Japanese. Moreover, Levine and Montero (1973) have documented 
very substantial socioeconomic mobility among Japanese-Americans, 
mobility that has also increasingly isolated them from an identifiable 
Japanese-American ethnic community. 
Yet, paradoxically, at precisely the moment that the white ethnics 
have become most fully culturally and socially assimilated into American 
society, their interest in and identification with their ethnic roots has 
become most pronounced. In The Ethnic Myth Stephen Steinberg 
has recently argued that ". . . the impulse to recapture the ethnic past 
is a belated realization that ethnicity is rapidly diminishing as a signifi- 
cant factor in American life" (Steinberg, 1981:73). Although neither 
is especially sympathetic to the notion of an ethnic revival, both Irving 
Howe (1977) and Herbert Gans (1982) suggest another source of the 
surge of interest in things ethnic. In an interpretation reminiscent of 
Herberg's (1955) explanation of the surge of religiosity a generation 
earlier, they find that ethnicity provides a fashionable, socially accept- 
able source of personal identity in an increasingly homogenized 
America. In Howe's words, , 
We are all aware that our ties with the European past grow increasingly feeble. 
Yet we feel uneasy before the prospect of becoming "just Americans." We feel 
uneasy before the prospect of becoming as undistinguishable from one another 
as our motel rooms are, or as fhvorless and mass-produced as the bread many 
of us eat. (Howe, 1977:18) 
Thus, although there appears to be widespread interest today among 
many Americans in retrieving or maintaining a sense of ethnic identity 
- what Cans called "symbolic ethnicity," precisely how deep and 
enduring the ethnic revival will remain is problematic. 
T h e  State of Black America 
If Greeley's characterization of the "ethnic miracle" is correct, if Poles, 
Italians, and the Irish have "made it," what are the implications of 
this fact? For many Americans, the "extraordinary success story" of 
Catholics and Jews, who had to overcome poverty, discrimination, 
illiteracy, and chronic overcrowding in the nation's urban ghettos, is 
proof that America is indeed the land of opportunity. One frequently 
invoked explanation for the success of "white ethnics" is that they were 
able to overcome the disabilities with which they were confronted 
because, through hard work, industry, perseverance, self-reliance, and 
thrift, they exploited as fully as possible the economic opportunity 
that America afforded - they pulled themselves up "by their own 
bootstraps," without governmental assistance. Another explanation 
contends that ethnic economic success is "only a matter of time" and 
that the most recent ethnic groups must not be impatient with their 
present place at the bottom of the economic ladder, for in several 
generations they will inevitably repeat the experience of European 
ethnic groups and climb into the American economic, educational, 
and political mainstream. Such explanations are obviously directed 
at those ethnic groups that have not yet achieved levels of economic 
success comparable to those of the "white ethnics" - Mexican- 
Americans, Puerto Ricans, American Indians, and, in particular, black 
Americans. In the remaining portion of this essay I would like to 
examine the experience of black Americans during the 1970s. 
a or black Americans the 1960s was a decade of progress; during 
this period blacks experienced their greatest gains since emancipation. 
These gains were brought about by unprecedented efforts by federal, 
state, and local governments and by private organizations to remove 
the inequalities and to redress the injustices that had for years relegated I 
black Americans to second class citizenship. 
Most visible and dramatic were the legal changes that emanated 
from the federal government. For the first time in American history t 
the three branches of the federal government acted in concert on 
behalf of black Americans. The Supreme Court, whose 1954 Brown 
decision outlawing segregated schools symbolized the beginning of a 
new era for blacks, extended substantially the implications of the 
Brown decision. It outlawed state laws prohibiting racial intermarriage 
and prohibited racial discrimination in the rental and sale of private 
and public property. Moreover, it acted decisively to reject efforts by 
local school districts to evade its desegregation rulings, including 1 
unanimous support for school busing as one means of achieving that 
goal. Lyndon Johnson, a Southerner, provided the most unequivocal 
moral and political support of black aspirations of any President in 
American history. Through his leadership, the Congress enacted 
legislation that outlawed discrimination in public accommodations, t 
employment, housing, voting, and education. Furthermore, his "Great 
Society" economic programs provided federal financial support to 
enhance occupational and educational opportunities for blacks. 1 
By the end of the 1960s black Americans, particularly the better 
educated and more highly skilled, had made substantial gains, espe- 
cially economically and educationally. One of the best indices of these I 
changes was black median family income, which in 1959 was only half 
of white median family income. By 1964 it had risen to 54 percent of 
white income and, by 1969, reflecting the national efforts to reduce 
black inequalities and the economic expansion and prosperity that 
characterized the decade, it had risen to 61 percent. Thus, although the 
problems of black America, particularly for the poorly educated and 
the unskilled, remained acute, the efforts of the 1960s had clearly 
produced some impressive advances. 
Compared with the progress that had been achieved during the 
1960s, the decade of the 70s was at best a period during which the rate 
of black advance slowed appreciably; at worst it was a time of "retro- 
gression" and "retrenchment." The civil rights movement, which 
during the 1960s had, despite internal differences, generally displayed 
consensus concerning both goals and tactics, was now in disarray. Part 
of the reason for this lay in the movement's very success in achieving 
the impressive legislative and judicial victories of the 60s. But it also 
reflected the fact that for many black Americans the optimism of the 
early 60s had been shattered by the failure of these legislative changes 
to institute meaningful changes in their lives. Increasingly it became 
apparent that the abolition of legal barriers to public accommodations 
or to suburban housing, for example, did not address the essential 
economic problems of a substantial portion of the black population. 
The erosion of the fragile consensus among blacks was symbolized by 
the outbreaks of the civil disorders of the late 60s and by the emergence 
of the slogan, "black power," both of which did little to allay conscious 
and unconscious white anxieties concerning black demands for sub- 
stantial changes in the status quo. As many whites grew increasingly 
weary of what they perceived as government support for lawlessness 
and the constant media attention to blacks, the conservative mood 
of the country, symbolized by the 1968 election of Richard Nixon to 
the Presidency, increased. 
The most dramatic advances for blacks during the 1970s were found 
in the political arena. The tactics of public confrontations, boycotts, 
and demonstrations that in the late 50s and early 60s had been suc- 
cessful in effecting social change were supplanted in the 1970s by more 
traditional political activity. "Politics is the civil-rights movement of the 
1970s," said Maynard Jackson, the black mayor of Atlanta, Georgia 
(Sitkoff, 1981:229). Such a stance was possible because of the increase 
in black political strength brought about byrthe impact of the Voting 
Rights Act of 1965, which provided federal protection for the efforts of 
blacks to register and to vote in states throughout the South. The 
percentage of Southern blacks registered to vote increased from 35 
percent in 1964 to 65 percent in 1969. In Alabama the increase was 
from 19 to 61 percent, in Mississippi from 7 to 67 percent, and in 
Georgia from 27 to 60 percent (Polenberg, 1980: 192). 
These increases in black voters throughout the South contributed 
substantially to increased black political representation. In 1964 there 
were only 103 blacks holding elected offices (ranging from local school 
board member to president) among the nearly half a million elected 
officials in the entire country. By 1970 this number had increased to 
1,400 and by 1980 to 4,700, two thirds of them in the South. Moreover, 
the number of black mayors had increased from none in 1965 to 120 in 
1980, including the major cities of Atlanta, Detroit, Los Angeles, New 
Orleans, Richmond, Virginia, and Washington, D.C. 
Moreover, because of their strategic location in the major metro- 
politan areas of key industrial states, the combined voting strength of 
blacks represents a possible balance of power in close elections. This 
was demonstrated first in 1960, when John Kennedy's narrow victory 
over Richard Nixon was made possible by the substantial victory margin 
he obtained from black voters in several key industrial states. However, 
it was even more noteworthy in the 1976 election, when over 6.5 million 
blacks voted, over 90 percent for Jimmy Carter. Carter owed his 
victory margin in most Southern, as well as in several Northern, states, 
and thus his election, directly to the overwhelming support of black 
I 
voters. 
Yet despite these highly visible changes, by 1982 blacks still remained 
less than 1 percent of all elected officials in the country - a percentage 
not even closely approximating their 12 percent of the total population. I 
In the South, where blacks comprise more than 20 percent of the 
population, only 3 percent of the elected officials are black. Moreover, 
in many instances the political power that black elected officials do I 
have is limited by the fact that they are politically isolated or that, 
given the exodus of white middle class residents and businesses to the 
suburbs, they have gained political power without the financial 
resources with which to provide the jobs and services (educational, 
medical, police and fire protection) that their constituents most I 
urgently need. 
During the 70s, blacks also experienced substantial gains in educa- 
tion. By 1975 almost identical percentages of blacks (87%) and whites I 
(86%) aged 5-20 were enrolled in school; among persons 25-34 the 
median number of school years completed by blacks was only slightly 
less than for whites (12.00 for blacks and 12.60 for whites). During the I 
1970s there was a significant narrowing of the racial gap in levels of 
educational achievement. In 1960 33 percent of blacks aged 20-24 had 
completed high school, compared with 61 percent of whites. By 1978 
73 percent of blacks and 85 percent of whites had done so. In 1960 
only 4 percent of blacks and 12 percent of whites 24-34 had completed 
four or more years of college. By 1978 comparable figures were 11 
percent for blacks and 25 percent for whites. Similarly, although the 
black high school dropout rate was greater than for whites, there was 
a substantial reduction in the percentage of blacks who dropped out 
of high school (from 22% in 1968 to less than 17% in 1978 compared to 
a decline of 11.9% to 11.3% for whites. Furthermore, a steadily in- 
creasing percentage of blacks are attending college, so that by 1977 the 
percentage enrolled was nearly proportional to the black percentage of 
the total population, a striking increase over the college attendance 
rates of blacks in the mid-60s ('Jones, 1981). 
However, these statistics obscure substantial qualitative differences 
in black educational achievement. Ironically, black students in the 
South today are far more likely to attend racially integrated elementary 
and secondary schools than black students in the North. Because of 
the patterns of residential segregation in most American cities, 70 
percent of black children outside the South attend schools that are 
comprised predominantly of minority children. The situation is most 
acute in the nation's 26 largest cities, where three-fourths of all black 
children attend schools that have greater than 90 percent minority 
enrollment. It is this pattern of increasing racial isolation that has led 
to the increasing use of busing of school children to achieve racially 
balanced schools. 
The narrowing of the gap in terms of college attendance obscures 
the fact that, although black students are today found in a much wider 
range of educational institutions (including the nation's most selective 
colleges and universities) than ever before, a disproportionately larger 
percentage of blacks than whites attend two-year junior and com- 
munity colleges and about one-third attend historically black colleges. 
Although blacks now comprise nearly 11 percent of students enrolled 
in four-year colleges and universities in the United States, they received 
less than 7 percent of the bachelors degrees awarded in 1976-76. The 
disparity becomes even more marked at the graduate and professional 
levels. In 19%-76 blacks represented less than 6 percent of the graduate 
school enrollments, 4.5 percent of professional school enrollment, and 
during that year received less than 4 percent of the doctorates awarded 
(Jones, 1981). Although there clearly have been significant educational 
advances for blacks during the past decade, whether these educational 
improvements can be translated into improved economic status remains 
problematic. 
Thus, although considerable disparities between black and white still 
exist in politics and education, the trends in these arenas indicate 
qualified improvements for black Americans. However, such progress 
did not take place in the economic sphere, perhaps the most important 
institutional category. During the 1970s the economic inequalities 
between black and white increased substantially. The income gap 
separating black and white widened. As I previously noted, during the 
1960s black median family income rose from 50 percent of white family 
income in 1959 to 61 percent in 1969. By 1979 it had declined to 57 
percent. The gap in terms of absolute dollars nearly doubled, from 
a difference of $3,800 in 1969 to $7,500 in 1979. With the exception 
of three years during the 1970s, since 1954 the official black unemploy- 
ment rate has annually been at least double that for whites. In 1980 it 
stood at more than 13 percent of the black labor force. The National 
Urban League, whose research division continually surveys black 
households, contends that the official unemployment rate substantially 
underrepresents real unemployment because it does not include 
discouraged workers who have dropped out of the labor force entirely. 
Thus the Urban League's Hidden Unemployment Index, which 
includes such individuals, placed the 1980 unemploymerit figure at 25 
percent - a figure equal to the national rate at the height of the Great \ 
Depression (Hill, 1981). 
Finally, the official unemployment rate for black teenagers stood 
at nearly 40 percent throughout most of the decade, again more than 
1 ,
double the rate for whites. But these figures are national averages and 
obscure the variations among different cities, in some of which, the 
Urban League estimates, the jobless rate for black teenagers may be i 
as high as 80 percent. Thus the overall economic status of black 
America appears to have deteriorated during the 70s. 
But a consideration of the overall socioeconomic status of blacks 
obscures the growing class divisions within black America. The role and 
significance of these class divisions has generated the most contro- 
versial debate in American race relations today. In this book The 
Declining Signzjcicance of Race (1978) black sociologist William J. 
Wilson argues that in the economic life of black Americans today 
"class has become more important than race in determining black 
access to privilege and power." Wilson contends that in the past 
systematic racial discrimination was the major factor responsible for 
the unequal economic, political, and social status of black Americans. 
However, in modern American society many of the traditional racial 
barriers have been fundamentally altered. There have been changes in 
the economy and in governmental and corporate commitment to racial 
equality. These changes have enabled the black middle class, which 
possesses the requisite training and educational qualifications, to ex- 
perience "unprecedented job opportunities in the growing government 
and corporate sectors, opportunities that are at least comparable to 
those of whites with equivalent qualifications" (Wilson, 1981 :37). 
During the 1970s middle class blacks made impressive economic 
advances. The number of blacks in professional and managerial 
positions increased to two and a half times what it had been in 1965. 
Indeed, between 1975 and 1980 the largest gains in black employment 
were in higher-status occupations. During this period the number of 
blacks employed increased by 1.3 million, over half of them in man- 
agerial, professional and craft jobs (Hill, 1981:22). Moreover, Wilson 
points out that, in contrast to the situation prior to 1960 in which the 
ratio of black income to white income actually decreased as educational 
attainment increased, this pattern has now been reversed; the higher 
the black educational level, the more closely incomes approximate 
those of whites. In 1978 black males who graduated from college 
earned on average slightly more than comparable whites (Wilson, 
1981:37). 
~oweber ,  Wilson argues, there is a growing division in black America 
between the middle class and a poverty-stricken underclass, which 
lacks education and job skills, is characterized by high rates of un- 
employment and welfare dependency, and is isolated residentially from 
employment opportunities. While the underclass has failed to partic- 
ipate in the progress experienced by the black middle class, its social 
and economic position has deteriorated. Although the black under- 
class represents a legacy of racial discrimination, class, not racial, 
factors are primarily responsible for sustaining the underclass today. 
Lacking the necessary training and job skills for positions in the modern 
economy, members of the underclass are instead the victims of broad 
economic and technological changes in American society. Even if all 
racial prejudice and discrimination were eliminated, the black under- 
class would still lack the necessary qualifications with which to partic- 
ipate in the mainstream of the American economy and would continue 
to be found primarily in the lowpaying, unskilled sector of the economy 
where unemployment is extremely high. 
The thrust of Wilson's thesis is that major attention must be directed 
not merely to the removal of racial barriers (which he acknowledges 
still confront blacks in education, politics, and, especially, in housing) 
but to the very structure of the American economy and its inability 
to provide economic opportunity for a substantial segment of its 
population. However, the implications of his analysis transcend the 
specific situation of blacks and extend to other racial-ethnic minorities 
(Mexican-Americans, Puerto Ricans, and Native Americans especially) 
who increasingly have been isolated in terms of education and job skills 
and locked into the poverty areas of cities where employment oppor- 
tunities have substantially diminished during the past two decades. 
The challenge for American society in the next decade, therefore, 
will be not only to ensure that the barriers of racial discrimination 
continue to recede, but that the class barriers that preclude minority 
access to economic opportunities are also eliminated. 
Table 1 
Racial and Hispanic Population in the United States 
1970 - 1980 
Number (in thousands) Percentage distribution 
1980 1970 1980 1970 
TOTAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  226,505 203,212 100.0 
White . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  188,341 177,749 83,2 
Black. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  26,488 22,580 11.7 
American Indian, 
Eskimo, and AIeut . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,418 827 0.6 
Asian and Pacific 
Islander . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  3,501 1,539 1.5 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Chinese 806 435 0.4 
Filipino . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  775 343 0.3 
Japanese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  701 591 0.3 
Asian Indian. . . . . . . .  .. . . . . .  362 NA 0.2 
Korean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  355 NA 0.1 
Vietnamese . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  262 NA 0.1 
Hispanic* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  14,606 9,073 6.4 
Mexican-American* . . . . . . . . .  8,763 4,532 3.9 
Puerto Rican* . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  2,044 1,429 0.9 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  Cuban* 876 544 0.4 
Central-South 
American* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,168 1,508 0.5 
Other* . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  1,753 1.057 0.8 
Other . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .  6,757 517 3.0 
NA - Not available 
* - 1980 data estimated 
* 
- Hispanics included in white, black and "other" categories 
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